Vulnerability as Meaning: Reflections on the Loss of Human Fragility in Transhumanist Futures

Abstract

This paper critically examines the philosophical significance of human vulnerability and the existential risks posed by its erasure in the context of transhumanist futures. Drawing on phenomenological thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Levinas, alongside African philosophical frameworks rooted in Ubuntu ethics, the study argues that fragility is not merely a limitation to be overcome but a fundamental condition of human meaning, creativity, and ethical life. Phenomenological insights emphasise embodiment, finitude, and ethical responsibility as intrinsic to lived experience, while Ubuntu underscores the relational and communal dimensions of vulnerability. Together, these traditions affirm that human flourishing emerges through, rather than in spite of, fragility. The paper interrogates the core assumptions of transhumanism, particularly the pursuit of technological mastery over disease, ageing, and death. It critiques the reduction of human value to optimisation and the potential consequences of disembodied enhancement, including existential detachment, relational alienation, and moral erosion. Furthermore, it raises concerns about the socio-ethical implications of enhancement technologies in postcolonial contexts, where structural inequalities may lead to new forms of exclusion and ontological injustice. By integrating African and Western philosophical perspectives, the paper contends that any future-oriented technological vision must be ethically accountable to the conditions that sustain empathy, solidarity, and shared humanity. Rather than aiming to eliminate vulnerability, a more humane trajectory would seek to honour and support it, ensuring that technological advancement deepens—rather than diminishes—the meaning of human life. In this way, the paper contributes